Menu
Trump Administration Action Against Social Security Judges Threatens Fair Access to Benefits
March 14, 2025
| By Kathleen Romig
The Trump Justice Department announced on February 20 that it believes the legal protections against firing administrative law judges (ALJs) — independent judges who serve at executive branch agencies — are unconstitutional and does not plan to follow existing law that protects ALJs from being removed without cause.[1] This action, one of a series of Administration moves targeting independent officials or agencies within the executive branch,[2] is a major assault on the independence of ALJs and risks undermining fair access to Social Security and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, with other potential harmful consequences across the federal government.
The large majority of ALJs work at the Social Security Administration (SSA). (See box, “Administrative Law Judges Also Protect Workers, Consumers, Investors.”) SSA ALJs decided nearly 425,000 cases in 2024. While they hear appeals from Social Security and SSI applicants and beneficiaries, ALJs are particularly important in ensuring fair access to Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits. In a typical year, more than three-quarters of applicants for SSDI are denied at the initial level of the application process. Of those denied, about one-third appeal their cases to an ALJ. In total, of all the claims that are approved, roughly one-quarter are approved following an appeal to an ALJ.
ALJs help ensure that claimants’ applications for benefits are treated fairly and impartially based on the eligibility rules. Independent ALJs provide at least two critical benefits to the hearing process at SSA. First, they increase the likelihood that an eligible claimant receives the benefits they are entitled to, despite more cursory denials earlier in the process. Second, they give all claimants the opportunity to meet with decision-makers face to face and explain their situation.
The Administration’s assertion that it can remove ALJs without cause eliminates a key source of ALJs’ judicial independence by raising the specter that the Administration could retaliate against ALJs if it dislikes their decisions, pressure ALJs to deny disability claims more aggressively under threat of removal, or replace existing ALJs with unqualified or ideologically motivated judges. Even the possibility that such pressure could be applied risks robbing the system of trust, which could lead many more claimants to seek relief by appealing SSA benefits denials to federal court, the last possible level of review. Such a development would reduce the efficiency of the SSA hearing process and contribute to significant judicial backlogs, delaying restitution and resolution in cases far beyond SSA.
Social Security Administration Employs Most Federal ALJs
Administrative law judges serve as judges for executive branch agencies. By law, they have judicial independence and perform a role similar to the trial judges who preside over civil cases.[3] Some 86 percent of federal ALJs are employed by SSA in its Office of Hearings Operations.[4] (See Figure 1.) SSA’s 1,121 ALJs decided nearly 425,000 cases in 2024.[5]
SSA ALJs hear appeals from Social Security and SSI applicants and beneficiaries. They hold hearings, issue decisions, and review post-hearing appeals. They work, along with support staff, in SSA’s nationwide network of nearly 200 hearings offices, which gives claimants the opportunity for in-person hearings.[6] Most of their cases involve applications for disability benefits after SSA initially denied a claim. Since most disability claims are initially denied, the ability to appeal to a neutral and independent interpreter of complex eligibility rules is critical to giving claimants confidence that the process is trustworthy and the decision is fair.
Administrative Law Judges Also Protect Workers, Consumers, Investors
Outside of SSA, ALJs work across dozens of federal agencies, helping ensure that powerful or politically connected firms in industries like health care, energy, and finance adhere to the same standard of the law as everyone else. For example, ALJs review evidence, resolve disputes, and, in some instances, determine recommended penalties or sanctions in cases involving allegations of:
- Unjustified Medicare claims denials or fraudulent health care billings by medical providers (Department of Health and Human Services);
- Workforce safety, overtime, or child labor violations or other unfair labor practices by employers (Department of Labor and the National Labor Relations Board);
- Illegal rate-setting or price-fixing by energy companies (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission); and
- Violations of securities and futures laws (Securities and Exchange Commission and Commodity Futures Trading Corporation).
In the early 2010s, after the quality of ALJ decisions came under scrutiny, SSA took a number of steps to ensure more consistent decision-making. SSA now monitors ALJs closely to identify those with extremely high or low allowance rates, assesses the quality of ALJ decisions by reviewing a sample of allowances before they take effect, and limits the number of cases per ALJ to protect against hasty decisions. It also has given ALJs new tools to help them review their own performance.[7] Following those reforms, SSA ALJs approve a significantly smaller share of the disability cases they review. (See Figure 2.)
Impartial ALJs Help Ensure Applicants Get Full Hearing, Fair Decision
People applying for disability benefits must submit an application along with extensive medical records and other documentation. SSA field office staff review those materials to determine whether the applicant meets the non-medical criteria for benefit eligibility. In SSDI, “technical denials” for failure to meet those criteria typically occur when an applicant hasn’t worked long enough. For applications that do meet the non-medical criteria, a disability examiner in the Disability Determination Service (DDS), a state-level agency that contracts with SSA, then determines whether the applicant is eligible based on the medical criteria. If a claim is denied, the applicant may seek reconsideration — essentially a review of the same materials by a different DDS examiner.
An applicant who is denied upon reconsideration may seek a de novo hearing — that is, an in-depth review of their case by an ALJ, who will make an independent determination of the facts without being bound by previous decisions. An ALJ hearing is also the first time an applicant can make their case in person (or via telephone or video) and offer testimony, since prior reviews are decided based on the submitted documents alone. Hearings are also distinct because ALJs may call witnesses to help inform their decision, including medical or vocational experts. In addition, applicants typically have a lawyer or other representative at the hearing stage to help them present the facts of their case, and they may submit new evidence.[8]
Typically, case files are much more developed at the hearing stage. After the hearing, the ALJ issues a written decision. (Typically, ALJs are assisted by a decision writer. Some of these decision writers have already been fired by the Trump Administration, along with other “probationary” federal employees, which will likely cause further delays in the already lengthy appeals process.[9])
In a typical year, about one-third of SSDI applicants who are denied at the initial level appeal their cases to an ALJ.[10] In about half of those cases, ALJs approve their claims; these approvals constitute roughly one-quarter of the claims that are allowed. In all, about 8 percent of SSDI applications — those ultimately accepted or denied — are approved by ALJs. (See Figure 3.) While an ALJ hearing can be quite involved, it is a relatively efficient way to address the hundreds of thousands of appeals that might otherwise end up in federal court.
Every applicant’s situation is unique; because ALJs can consider more evidence in greater depth than DDS disability examiners and can call upon expert testimony, they are better able to judge whether more complex or unusual claims meet the vocational or medical eligibility standards. For example, applicants whose impairment does not meet one of the listed medical criteria for eligibility but is “medically equal” to the criteria — perhaps through a combination of impairments that together are equal in severity and duration to any listed impairment — are more likely to be denied before receiving a hearing with an ALJ.
Finally, ALJs often see claimants whose condition has deteriorated since their initial application. The lag between application and hearing is typically over two years.[11] A large fraction of disability applicants have degenerative conditions, which often become measurably worse by the time of their hearings.
Threatening ALJ Independence Would Undermine Due Process, Risk Access to Earned Benefits
The role of the ALJ is to help ensure that claimants’ applications for benefits are treated fairly and impartially based on the eligibility rules in place. Independent ALJs provide at least two critical benefits to the hearing process at SSA. First, they increase the likelihood that an eligible claimant receives the benefits they are entitled to, despite more cursory denials earlier in the process. Second, they give all claimants the opportunity to meet with decision-makers face to face and explain their situation. Claimants often experience the disability determination process as impersonal, arbitrary, and even dehumanizing; the opportunity to be heard by independent fact-finders legitimizes the process and maintains some degree of trust in the federal government.
To maintain their independence, for nearly 80 years ALJs have been legally protected from being fired unless for good cause, as determined by the independent Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). Congress enacted the 1946 law that provides this protection, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), after a series of Supreme Court cases in the 1930s found that ALJs were “mere tools of the agency concerned and subservient to the agency heads in making their proposed findings of fact and recommendations.”[12] The APA’s removal protections are designed to reduce political interference in ALJ decisions and ensure their independence.
The Trump Justice Department announced on February 20 that it believes ALJ removal protections are unconstitutional and does not plan to follow existing law that protects ALJs from being removed without cause.[13] (Ten days earlier, President Trump had fired Cathy Harris, the MSPB chair appointed by President Biden, from the board, though she sued to prevent her removal and a federal judge recently ruled that the firing was illegal.)[14] The Justice Department announcement claimed this decision is “in accordance with Supreme Court precedent,” but in fact the most recent Supreme Court case challenging ALJs’ independence, Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy in 2024, explicitly did not rule on removal protections for ALJs.[15]
If the Administration can remove ALJs at will, it is free to use the threat of removal to pressure them to base their decisions on the Administration’s priorities rather than the facts of the case and to replace ALJs who refuse to go along. Many claimants, fearing that such pressure could be applied, would likely seek relief in federal courts, contributing to significant judicial backlogs and thus delaying restitution and resolution in cases far beyond SSA.
Copy link
Copy link
Copy link
Copy link
Topics:
Share
Facebook BlueSky X Print Email
PDF of this report (6 pp.)
Report
Many Trump Administration Personnel Actions Are Unlawful
February 14, 2025
Blog
Disability Allowance Rates Fall as Social Security Strengthens Oversight of Hearings
February 10, 2015
Policy Basics
Social Security
- Federal Payroll Taxes
- Social Security Disability Insurance
- Supplemental Security Income
- Top Ten Facts about Social Security
- Understanding the Social Security Trust Funds
End Notes
[1] Department of Justice, “Statement from Justice Department Chief of Staff Chad Mizelle,” February 20, 2025, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-justice-department-chief-staff-chad-mizelle.
[2] David Super, “Many Trump Administration Personnel Actions Are Unlawful,” CBPP, February 14, 2025, https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-budget/many-trump-administration-personnel-actions-are-unlawful#ending-the-independence-of-independent-cbpp-anchor.
[3] Congressional Research Service (CRS), “Administrative Law Judges: An Overview,” https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20100413_RL34607_75118bdf564447ead99d9e735c2122f1865f909d.pdf.
[4] U.S. Office of Personnel Management, “Administrative Law Judges,” https://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/administrative-law-judges/#url=By-Agency.
[5] SSA, “Caseload Analysis Report,” https://socsecnews.blogspot.com/2025/02/note-amount-of-overtime.html.
[6] Social Security Administration (SSA), “Hearings and Appeals,” https://www.ssa.gov/appeals//ho_locator.html; SSA, “Annual Statistical Supplement, 2024,” https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2024/2f1-2f3.html.
[7] Paul Van de Water, “Disability Allowance Rates Fall as Social Security Strengthens Oversight of Hearings,” CBPP, February 10, 2015, https://www.cbpp.org/blog/disability-allowance-rates-fall-as-social-security-strengthens-oversight-of-hearings.
[8] SSA, “Social Security Administration (SSA) Annual Data for Representation at Social Security Hearings,” https://www.ssa.gov/data/representation-at-ssa-hearings.html.
[9] Eli Hager, “Anxiety Mounts Among Social Security Recipients as DOGE Troops Settle In,” ProPublica, February 22, 2025, https://www.propublica.org/article/doge-social-security-elon-musk-trump-closures-benefits.
[10] SSA, “Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, 2023,” https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di_asr/2023/sect04.html.
[11] SSA, “Social Security performance,” https://www.ssa.gov/ssa-performance.
[12] Quoted in Benjamin M. Barczewski, “Removal Protections for Administrative Adjudicators: Constitutional Scrutiny and Considerations for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, September 21, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10823.
[13] Department of Justice.
[14] Tom Jackman, “Federal judge rules Trump’s firing of merit board chair was illegal,” Washington Post, March 4, 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2025/03/04/trump-firing-cathy-harris-mspb-illegal/.
[15] While the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had ruled in this case that the removal protections afforded to ALJs in the Securities and Exchange Commission unconstitutionally infringed on the President’s authority to remove officers of the United States, the Supreme Court declined to address the Fifth Circuit decision on this question. See Daniel T. Shedd, “SEC v. Jarkesy: Constitutionality of Administrative Enforcement Actions,” Congressional Research Service, September 16, 2024, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB11229.
More from the Authors
Areas of Expertise
Recent Work:
- Trump Administration Action Against Social Security Judges Threatens Fair Access to Benefits
- SSA Reverses Newly Imposed Restrictions on Birth and Death Reporting in Maine
- Proposed Cuts to SSI Would Hurt Disabled Children and Their Families
Stay up to dateSubmit
Receive the latest news and reports from the Center
Footer menu
Footer 2
202.408.1080
Connect with the Center
Facebook Twitter Instagram YouTube
Subscribe to Email Updates
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
1275 First Street NE, Suite 1200 Washington, DC 20002
©2024 Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
All rights reserved. Privacy | Terms of Use
Site Title 